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Abstract—This study is an attempt to enhance the security of 
Robust Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authentication (RCIA) 
ultra-lightweight authentication protocols. In the RCIA 
protocol, IDs value is sent between reader and tag as a constant 
value. This makes RCIA susceptible to traceability attack which 
lead to the privacy issue.  In order to overcome this problem, 
Random Number Generator (RNG) technique based on Bitwise 
operations has been used in the tag side. The idea of this 
technique is to change the IDs of a tag on every query session so 
that it will not stay as a constant value. The implementation of 
Enhanced RCIA has been conducted by using a simulation. The 
simulation provided the ability to show that the operations of 
RCIA protocol as to compare with the enhanced RCIA. The 
outcome shows that the enhanced RCIA outperforms existing 
one in terms of privacy. 
 
Index Terms—RCIA; Ultra-Lightweight Protocol; 
Authentication; Random Number; Technique; Traceability; 
Attack. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a non-contact 
automatic identification technology uses radio waves to 
achieve the object identification and data exchange. The 
RFID system consist of tag which wirelessly communicate 
with the reader and back-end database stores items of the tag.  
The nature of communication in the RFID system makes it 
susceptible to a wide range of attacks. One of them is the 
attack that affects the communication channel between reader 
and tag. Therefore, the authentication protocols which were 
applied in this system are very important. Depending on the 
level of complexity of the operations it carried out, the RFID 
classification of authentication protocols can be divided into 
four different classes.  
The first class is full-fledged authentication protocol which 
allows application classics cryptographic functions such as 
symmetric encryption, public and private key and one-way 
hash functions. The second one, simple authentication 
protocol which supports the generation of random numbers 
and hash functions. The third category is a lightweight 
authentication protocol that supports random number 
generator, simple functions such as Cyclic Redundancy Code 
(CRC) and simple bitwise operations (hash function is not 
included). The last one is ultra-lightweight authentication 
protocol can support simple bitwise operations (XOR, AND 
and OR) [1]. 
 
 
 
II. PRIVACY ISSUE OF ULTRA-LIGHTWEIGHT 
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
 
This study aims to enhance the security of ultra-lightweight 
authentication protocol. Therefore, the related work 
introduced in this section, only focus on these protocols. 
Several studies reviewed and evaluated the security issues of 
RFID ultra-lightweight authentication protocols. In these 
studies, high level of vulnerabilities was detected. These 
vulnerabilities include, common threats, such as 
desynchronization and DoS attack, in addition to, tracking the 
location of the tag. 
In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al. proposed an Ultra-Lightweight 
Mutual Authentication Protocol family (UMAP). This family 
includes two protocols which are: Lightweight Mutual 
Authentication Protocol (LMAP) [2] and Efficient Mutual 
Authentication Protocol (EMAP) [3]. The analysis of UMAP 
family, pointed out that the protocols vulnerable to malicious 
attacks. In 2008, Li and Wang [4] proposed two attacks 
(desynchronization and full disclosure) on LMAP and EMAP 
and successfully refute security claims of both protocols. In 
these protocols, the previous IDs value was not stored in the 
reader. If the attacker interrupts the communication among 
reader and tag, and block D message, the tag will update its 
values while the reader will not and it will remain using its 
previous values. In this case, in the next query from reader to 
tag, the tag will respond with its current IDs which is quite 
different from the IDs stored in the reader. As a result of that, 
the tag will become useless. This indicates that the UMAP 
protocols cannot prevent desynchronization and disclosure 
attack.  
Furthermore, UMAP can neither resist disclosure nor de-
synchronization and cannot resist traceability attack. In 
UMAP, since the eavesdropper can pretend to be legitimate 
reader, when the reader sends a query to the tag, the 
eavesdropper gets the response with IDs. In the next query, 
when the legitimate reader sends a request, the tag will 
respond with same IDs, so that UMAP cannot resist 
traceability attacks. In 2007, Chien[1] proposed the Strong 
Authentication and Strong Integrity (SASI) protocol. This 
protocol reported in [5]-[7], their findings provide 
confirmatory evidence that SASI has several vulnerabilities 
such as desynchronization and secret disclosure attacks. In 
2011, a successful desynchronization attack was shown on 
SASI protocol [7]. Thus, in 2013, Avoine, Carpent & Martin 
proposed a successful passive full-disclosure attack [8]. In 
2009, a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol called 
(Gossamer) was proposed [9]. This protocol proposed as an 
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extension to SASI protocol to overcome its weakness [10]-
[11]. Although this protocol shown resistance to a passive full 
disclosure attack, nevertheless, the desynchronization and 
Denial of Service (DOS) attacks still exist in this protocol 
[12]-[13]. The operations of Gossamer protocol are similar to 
other previously proposed protocols, except that, in 
Gossamer, they add two new functions; Double Rotation and 
MixBits [9]. In 2012, Zubair, Mujahid and Ahmed [14] 
improved the performance of Gossamer protocol by proposed 
a counter based methodology. Combination this counter in 
Gossamer protocol makes it resilient against DOS and 
desynchronization attacks. In 2009, David and Prasad [15] 
presented a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol 
based on Bitwise operations. This protocol uses only two 
Bitwise logical operations AND and XOR, which contributed 
to reduce computational power at tag side. In David-Prasad 
protocol, reader needs to get one-day certificate from CA 
(Certificate Authority) before inquiring the tag. Reader 
initiates the protocol by sending “Hello” message to the tag. 
Tag then responds with its current IDs, reader matches this 
IDs with IDs stored in the back-end database; if a match 
found, it will produce two random numbers (n1, n2), calculate 
and send (A, B and D) to the tag. However, in 2010, a group 
of researcher [16] proposed full disclosure attack (Tango) on 
the David-Prasad protocol. Tango attack requires GA (good 
approximations) equations based on hamming distance with 
unknown variable. Later on, Barrero, Hernández-Castro, 
Peris-Lopez and Camacho [17] presented genetic tango attack 
to improve Tango attack and later on, resolved the exhaustive 
searching of GA equations. In 2012, a new ultra-lightweight 
authentication protocol called RFID authentication protocol 
with permutation (RAPP) was proposed [10]. Unlike 
previous protocols, this protocol relied on the new technique. 
In this protocol the tag has the ability to perform three simple 
functions: Bitwise XOR operation, left rotation Rot(), and 
Per() function. All these functions are cheap to implement in 
the tag [10]. However, in 2012, a group of researcher 
highlighted two attacks on RAPP, desynchronization and 
traceability attack [18, 19]. Avoine & Carpent (2013) 
indicated that, the protocol RAPP- contrary to the claim of its 
designers -prone to desynchronization attack18. In 2013, 
Ahmadian, Salmasizadeh & Aref [20], launched a 
desynchronization attack on this protocol and highlighted the 
poor composition of RAPP messages. In the same year, Shao-
hui, Zhijie, Sujuan and Dan-wei [19] highlighted some 
weaknesses of the newly proposed permutation function [12], 
which can be easily exploited to uncover secrets in the tag. 
In 2015, robust confidentiality, integrity, and 
authentication (RCIA) protocol has been proposed [21]. The 
RCIA protocol [21] was able to solve some of the weaknesses 
in the previous protocols, such as desynchronization and full 
disclosure attack, by introducing and using a new ultra-
lightweight primitive Recursive Hash function (Rh) [13]. 
However, it still suffers from traceability attack which raised 
privacy issue. In the RCIA protocol the authors claimed that 
RCIA resists against traceability attack since the messages 
(A, B, C, and D) combined with random numbers (n1 and n2). 
In the RCIA protocol, the update operation for IDs value is 
performed only after each successful session. In this case, this 
update will prevent the attacker from tracking the tag with the 
assumption that the tag was read by legal reader. 
Unfortunately, if the tag was read by illegal reader (i.e.: an 
attacker can pretend to be legitimate) traceability attack can 
happen in this scenario. In this case, when illegal reader sends 
a query to the tag, the attacker gets response from the tag by 
sending its IDs. In the next illegal query, the tag will send the 
same IDs which make it prone to traceability attack. The main 
reason for this risk is when the illegal reader initiates a query 
to the tag, the responses of the tag each time are constant IDs. 
Figure 1 describes the operations of RCIA protocol. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The operations of RCIA protocol 
 
In the second step of RICA protocol, it can be clearly seen 
that the (IDs) value of the tag sent as a fixed value, and this 
value cannot updated only by legitimate reader [21], as shown 
in the fifth step. As a result of that, the attacker can easily 
track the location of tag’s carrier by sending a multi query to 
the tag and the tag will response by sending the same IDs to 
the illegitimate reader. These reasons pointed out that the 
RCIA protocol vulnerable to traceability attack. The next 
Table1 shows a simple comparison of main attacks resistance, 
between the most recent ultra-lightweight authentication 
protocols. 
 
Table 1 
Attacks Resistance Comparison between ultra-lightweight authentication 
Protocols 
 
 Traceability 
Attack 
Desynchronization 
Attack 
Disclosure 
Attack 
UMAP 
family 
X X X 
SASI X X X 
Gossamer X X  
David-
Prasad 
X  X 
RAPP X X  
RCIA X   
 
X: Susceptible to attack 
: Resists such an attack 
 
III. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR (RNG) TECHNIQUE 
 
Enhancing the security of ultra-lightweight authentication 
protocols in the RFID system is a challenge; due to it supports 
only simple operations like Bitwise [1]. This is because ultra-
lightweight protocols were designed for low cost RFID 
system and this makes it unable to have complex 
cryptographic methods (e.g.: one way hashed function). This 
is a distinct characteristic of ultra-lightweight protocols 
which also serves as a limitation to it. With this limitation, 
the RNG needs to consider the usage of Bitwise operations to 
generate random number (Rn) which can effectively be 
implemented in the tag side [1].  
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Random Number Generator (RNG) is an algorithm uses to 
produce a sequence of unpredictable random numbers. The 
RNG is very important to increase the security of any system 
due to using the same value for each session will lead to 
possible traceability attack. The RNG can be generated using 
various algorithms in order to produce random numbers (Rn). 
The RNG technique proposed in this study is based on 
Bitwise XOR and shifts (left and right). The following section 
will discuss further on the algorithm used in the RNG called 
the XOR-Shift* Algorithm. 
 
IV. XOR-SHIFT* ALGORITHM 
 
In 2003, XOR-Shift algorithm has been proposed by 
Marsaglia22, as a very fast and high quality random number 
generator. This algorithm is based on repeatedly applying 
exclusive-OR (XOR) and shift operations (left and right) 
[22]. However, in 2014, Vigna [23], proposed XOR-Shift* 
algorithm following suggestion in Marsaglia's paper. The 
suggestion is multiplying the result of an XOR-shift generator 
by a suitable constant. This constant makes possible to 
generate a permutation of the sequence by the underlying 
XOR-Shift generator.  
Based on rigorous experimental procedures, this XOR-
Shift* generators successfully passed strong statistical test 
suites tool (i.e.: BigCrush and Dieharder) and was recognized 
as the fastest generator between all tested generators (i.e.: 
MT19937, xorgens4096, WELL1024a and WELL19937a) 
23. XOR-Shift* algorithm acts as the main components of 
RNG. This algorithm takes into account the characteristics of 
ultra-lightweight authentication protocols and thus can be 
used in RCIA [23]. 
Without RNG in the RCIA protocol, when the illegal reader 
send request to the tag, it will respond with same IDs in each 
query session. This makes RCIA protocol vulnerable to 
traceability attack, which leads to privacy issue. With the 
RNG, the random numbers (Rn) are generated by using XOR-
Shift* algorithm and concatenates with IDs to produce a new 
one (i.e.: newIDs). This will enable the tag to send different 
IDs in each query session. With the assumption that the query 
comes from illegal reader (i.e.: attacker), the tag will respond 
with different IDs in each query session. For example, in 
query session (1), the tag returns X as IDs while in query 
session (2), the tag returns Y as IDs. In this case the attacker 
will not be able recognize whether the IDs belongs to which 
tag. Thus this prevents traceability attack and solves the 
privacy issue. 
 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RNG 
 
The implementation of the RNG has been conducted by 
developing a prototype, due to the lack of hardware 
components of an RFID system (reader and tag). The 
prototype consists of three parts, which illustrate the main 
components of the RFID system, reader, tag and back-end 
database. The database contains all information that relates to 
the tag and reader, which is needed to accomplish the 
authentication processes. The operation of enhanced RCIA 
(i.e.: RCIA + RNG) is similar to the operations of existing 
RCIA protocol except that, in the enhanced RCIA, the RNG 
was used in the tag side. With this, updating IDs at the end of 
the query session is no longer necessary due to the 
randomization operations have been done by the RNG.  
The implementation involved the processes of RCIA and 
enhanced RCIA. This is to provide comparison to promote 
better understanding on the implementation perspectives.  
 
VI. EVALUATION 
 
The aim of evaluation is to show the RNG technique that 
has been embedded to the existing RCIA; to ensure that the 
ID values generated will not be the same for each query 
session. This will help to prevent traceability attack and solve 
the privacy issue.  
The evaluation scenario involved comparing between the 
existing RCIA and enhanced RCIA along with the 
traceability attack model adopted from [24].The following 
Table 2 describes the processes of the traceability attack 
model. 
 
Table 2 
Evaluation scenario 
 
Steps Attack processes 
1 
The attacker takes two tags, e.g. T0 and T1 and the 
identifiers for each one is (IDs)0 and (IDs)1 respectively.  
2 
The attacker randomly chooses one of the tags (T0 or T1), 
let’s say Ti with the identifier (IDs)i 
3 
The attacker runs one query session with Ti and stores (IDs)i 
= X 
4 
The attacker runs the query session N times by using illegal 
reader, where     N > 1. If (IDs)i in each time is not equal to 
X, in this case the attacker cannot track Ti . In other words, 
the attacker is unable to distinguish between T0 and T1. That 
means the enhanced RCIA successfully prevents the 
traceability attack. 
Otherwise, in each time, if the Ti responds with same (IDs)i. 
In this case the attacker can easily track Ti on the basis that 
(IDs)i is fixed value.    
  Solution – RNG Technique 
1 The illegal reader sends query to the tag (Ti) 
2 
Ti , uses RNG technique to generate a random number Rn 
and produce newIDs = IDs ⊕ ID | Rn  
3 The illegal reader received the newIDs 
 
The attacker runs the query session N times, where N > 1. In 
each time, Ti responds with different newIDs. In this case, 
the attacker is unable to distinguish between T0 and T1. That 
means the enhanced RCIA successfully prevents the 
traceability attack. 
 
The simulation has been performed many times (n > 1) to 
demonstrate the dynamic values of IDs in each query session. 
In each session, the tag in the RCIA protocol sent the same 
IDs to the reader. In contrast, the enhanced RCIA sent 
different IDs (newIDs) to the reader. With this simulated 
procedures, the enhanced RCIA has able to counter the 
problem of traceability attack by generating the random 
number (Rn). The different IDs values indicate that the 
attackers are now unable to trace the origin of the end users 
and thus prevent privacy violation issue. 
 
VII. LIMITATION 
 
In this study the operation of simulation tool limited on 
demonstrate that the RNG technique has successfully 
achieved its objective in producing the dynamic IDs. In other 
words, the simulation tool may not operate exactly like an 
actual device. Therefore, it only shows how the enhanced 
RCIA preventing the traceability attack by producing the 
dynamic IDs, using RNG technique.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This study aimed to enhance the security of RCIA ultra-
lightweight authentication protocol. This objective has 
achieved by adopting random number generator (RNG) 
technique. The RNG produced based on XOR-Shift* 
algorithm and used to provide a variable value for IDs. The 
RNG technique helped in preventing a traceability attack and 
as a result, solves a privacy issue.   
The implementation of RNG technique has been conducted 
by using simulation technique. In order to provide a 
comparison between RCIA and enhanced RCIA, the 
simulation included simulating the operations of both 
protocols. Furthermore, the simulation used to evaluate the 
enhanced RCIA. The result of simulated enhanced RCIA, 
showed that the RNG technique has successfully prevented 
the traceability attack.  
In the near future, the ultra-lightweight protocol 
specifically RCIA can consider other techniques or 
algorithms that probably may generate better results in 
enhancing the security. For instance, the RNG can consider 
another algorithm which may be more efficient. Additionally, 
other interested researcher can consider hardware 
implementation to expand the evaluation covering the 
performance and cost analysis perspective. It would also be 
useful to work on the adversarial platform, as to come up with 
several possible attacks so that preventive mechanisms can 
introduced even before the attacks were identified.  
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